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The CORE Program is a Center within 
the Defense Analysis department at 
NPS. Goals of CORE are to:
•  Expose a generation of military  
officers to cutting-edge visual 
analytical methodolgies — produce 
Intellectual Capital
•  Leader in education and research 
designed to operationalize advanced 
analytical methods — leverage 
emerging information technologies 
and analytical software packages to 
enable field operatives
•  Advance DOD’s Network Analysis 
capabilities — Illuminating Blue, 
Grey and Red Networks — Beyond 
Link Analysis
•  Maintain currency with the leading 
innovations in visual analytic methods, 
research and related technologies —  
OSD and SOCOM’s futures look at 
advanced analytical methods
•  Benefit the Warfighter — reduce the 
risk of uncertainty in decision making
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Visualization for Dark Network Analysis
By Patrick Dudas
Dark networks or terrorist informatics provide 
their own unique problem set because immedi-
ate reaction is critical to the success of authori-
ties looking for terroristic or criminal activity. 
The CORE Lab has developed an architecture 
and visualization to enhance user decision 
making using various saliencies from key utili-
ties designed for dark networks. We also con-
nect this information processed in Twitter 
and map geotagged tweets to a Google Map, 
combining both network topology and spatial 
information. We built a Twitter feed that al-
lows the user to click links embedded in the 
tweet directly so the user can see if a particu-
lar website, social feed, or video is causing the 
propagation of information or other sources 
they should consider viewing. An additional 
visualization allows the user the ability to see 
temporal pattern changes in the network. All 
of this tailored to be simplistic and individual-
ized allowing the user to input a location and 
either a username, hashtag, or keyword to pull 
information and begin visualizing. 
This platform is also novel in that as a website, 
the user can log in and work on the same da-
taset as another user by selecting that project. 
Multiple people can view multiple locations 
and multiple terms, but for a common goal in 
capturing and analyzing all information ob-
tained in that project. We provide two mecha-
nisms of visualizing: 1) Real-time network to-
pology, and 2) Long term network analysis.
Visualization in Real-time
We developed a web application that allows an 
analyst the ability to: 1) collect information on 
Twitter by hashtag, username, or keyword; 2) 
visualize this information or network in real-
time; and 3) change initial search criteria based 
on the visualization and applied social network 
analysis properties. 
The process starts by having the user log into 
the website and selecting either an existing da-
taset or creating a new one. Once a project is 
selected or created, the user then inputs city, 
state, country or zip code and a search term. For 
the search term, s/he can either select hashtag, 
username, or keyword to search. Lastly, the user 
can select the type of network s/he is interested 
in collecting and viewing, which includes: 1) 
username -> username 2) username -> hashtag 
3) hashtag -> hashtag. 
With the geocode, search term and network 
type specified, the application creates a global 
search query, which is communicated to Twit-
ter’s Search API while the page is active. 
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Crossing the Red Line
Examining Social Media and Social Network Analysis for Unconventional Campaign Planning
By MAJ Seth Lucente, COL Greg Wilson, RA Rob Schroeder, and RA Gregory Freeman
The outbreak of rebellion and conflict against the Assad re-
gime in March 2011 has raised questions in the United States 
and European nations about the security of Syria’s chemical 
weapons sites and potential use or transfer of such weapons. 
In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria sought to 
acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemical, biological and 
nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with the help 
of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.  US policy toward 
Syria since the 1980s has ranged from confrontation, contain-
ment, and cautious en-
gagement dealing with 
its clandestine WMD 
activities.   On August 
20, 2012, President 
Barack Obama cau-
tioned Syria on the use 
of WMD saying, “Any 
attempt by the Syrian 
government to employ 
or strategically field 
biological or chemical 
weapons would cross a 
‘red line’ that could lead the United States to change its posture 
in dealing with the Assad regime’s attempt to remain in pow-
er.”   However, with the American public war-weary and US 
resources stretched to the breaking point from over 10 years of 
protracted conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, a ground invasion 
is clearly an unattractive option.  
Developing unconventional intervention strategies that 
achieve US policy objectives and limit the expenditure of US 
blood and treasure will be increasingly in demand.  Unconven-
tional Warfare (UW) or assisting an ongoing rebellion offers 
US policy makers one such economy of force option to consid-
er.  However, UW requires in-depth knowledge of a country’s 
socio-cultural dynamics, social structure, resistance potential, 
and how those willing to take up arms against their govern-
ment might align with US policy objectives.  Developing the 
intelligence picture to 
provide this level of 
insight typically takes 
years to build and 
normally requires an 
extensive human intel-
ligence network.  Using 
the Syrian Rebellion as 
a case study, this essay 
examines the utility of 
leveraging open source 
social media (YouTube, 
Twitter, and Facebook) 
along with advanced analytical methodologies like social net-
work analysis (SNA) to increase our understanding of both 
the political and armed opposition.  Expanding our analytical 
tools for illuminating dark networks, such as resistance forces 
operating in denied areas, is a critical requirement for SOF 
planners to develop UW intervention strategy. 
“ Any attempt by the Syrian government to employ 
or strategically field biological or chemical weapons 
would cross a ‘red line’ that could lead the United 
States to change its posture in dealing with the Assad 
regime’s attempt to remain in power.”
- PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA 
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METHODOLOGY 
CORE Lab research associates at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey California conducted this study.  The CORE Lab 
is an OSD sponsored research activity that serves as the center 
of gravity for teaching and research on Irregular Warfare (IW) 
analytical methods.  Three visual analytic methodologies are 
emphasized in our courses and research projects: geospatial, 
temporal, and relational or social network analysis. The appli-
cation of these methodologies, and the analytical software tools 
associated with them, enables operators to collect, manage, and 
fuse data in order to create a more complete picture of the com-
mon operational environment.
This study fuses open source, social media, temporal records, 
geospatial data, and relational analysis to create a Common 
Operational Picture (COP) from which policy-makers and 
SOF military commanders can make informed decisions.  Geo-
spatial data facilitated the visualization of both Syrian geogra-
phy and the distribution of armed opposition forces and WMD 
sites located throughout the country.  Social network analysis 
examines relational data associated with over 290 individual, 
political and military opposition entities identified through 
open source research.  
The research team developed a detailed research plan that 
included the construction of ontologies and codebooks that 
standardize data collection and entry into analytical packages. 
Network visualizations were conducted using various analyti-
cal packages.   Additionally, a network visualization package 
developed in the CORE lab, called Dynamic Tweet Network 
Analysis (DTna), was used to scrape twitter data and social me-
dia content in select Syrian cities based on key word search terms. 
SYRIAN OPPOSITION NETWORK ANATOMY 
Identifying the key stakeholders entangled in the Syrian rebel-
lion is job one for UW campaign planners and is no easy task. 
Social network analysis has much to offer planners seeking to 
illuminate or map these dark networks. Social network analysis 
guru Valdis Krebs defines SNA as “the mapping and measur-
ing of relationships and flows between people, groups, organi-
zations and other connected information/knowledge entities. 
The nodes in the network are the people and groups while the 
links show relationships or flows between the nodes.”  
Social network analysis can provide key insights into the overall 
topography and structure of social networks.   Utilizing SNA, 
we examine the political and armed opposition’s network to-
pography and in particular looked at the network’s density and 
centralization.  Network density gives planners a feel for how 
sparse or connected the network is, while centralization helps 
provide insights on whether the network is centralized around 
a few key actors.  These measures confirmed our hypothesis 
that the opposition network is far from a formal, centralized 
hierarchy; in fact, it is an ad-hoc umbrella of interconnected, 
multi-relational, sub-organizations geographically dispersed 
throughout Syria that connects primarily through various so-
cial media applications
The most common network structure utilized by a revolution-
ary opposition force, whose units are spread geographically 
throughout the operational battlefield, is the federated model, 
which provides a good deal of autonomy to subordinate units. 
“In a federation, the core network serves as the hub of multi-
ple, relatively autonomous hubs.”   For example the American 
Revolutionary War was a federation of numerous state militias 
combined to field the American Continental Army.  Network 
centralization and variance are measures that capture the hier-
archical dimension of network topography. They help research-
ers determine how hierarchical (or non-hierarchical) a network. 
Centralization uses the variation in actor centrality within the 
network to measure the level of centralization. 
Social network visualizations (sociograms), like the one in Fig-
ure 1, provide key insights into the network’s social structure. 
Planners can gain valuable insights by examining the structural 
position of key actors within the network.  Here we can see that 
there is a group of actors (circled) who are in brokerage posi-
tions between the rebellion’s political and armed opposition.  If 
it is in the US interest to facilitate closer coordination between 
the political and armed opposition, then we would want to fur-
ther examine these actors located in structurally advantageous 
positions.  SNA was also used to identify central actors and co-
hesive subgroups within the network. 
In fact, one such subgroup detected was a Syrian homegrown 
Salafi-jihadist group - Jabhat Nusra. A Syrian analyst argues 
“Jabhat Nusra is far more dangerous to the long-term stabil-
ity of the Syrian state than foreign jihadist groups because it 
represents a metamorphosis of a Salafi-jihadist ideology into a 
domestic platform that is able to achieve popular resonance.” 
FSA COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK  
(SOCIAL MEDIA)
Social media has become a valuable political tool. “It is an 
unparalleled instrument for the purpose of mobilization, de-
nouncing state violence and other human rights abuses, as well 
as enabling democratization.”  Applications such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube allow users to interact, participate, or 
collaborate nearly real-time with one another. The proliferation 
of the smart-phone and nearly universal accesses to wireless 
Internet technologies has enabled social media users to rapidly 
mobilize social protests, document a humanitarian crisis as it 
unfolds, and disseminate information globally simply by push-
ing “send” on their wireless device.   The FSA’s communication 
network is a unique “Web-based community” that expects to 
be notified via social media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube).  The 
FSA utilizes social media for disseminating information, mon-
itoring current operations, logistics, and consolidating battle 
damage assessments reports – all critical for follow-on mis-
sions.  This investigation found that nearly ninety percent of 
the primary data sources originated from the three most widely 
and effectively used social media sources - Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube.  These social media sites provided a window into 
the armed opposition units and were leveraged to assess or-
ganizational structure, operational activities, unit strengths/
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weakness, combat effectiveness, and to determine if unit lead-
ership might align with US policy objectives. 
Analysis of the FSA’s authoritative (Command and Control) 
network combined with social media information highlights 
the fact that only 27 of the 42 opposition units claiming to 
support FSA operations actual did so. The remaining 15 units 
are simply uncooperative rogue elements that undermine civ-
il leaders and threaten any prospects for a viable post-Assad 
government.  Further, research 
on the 27 FSA units using Face-
book, Twitter and YouTube re-
vealed that only 4 of the 27 units 
had demonstrated proficiency 
in offensive combat operations 
against Assad’s Regime force, 
were closely aligned with the 
FSA at the strategic, operational 
and tactical level, and appeared to have the motivation and po-
tential to align with US policy objectives. 
GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS — RISK TERRAIN MODEL 
Arguably, the best way to assess risk and predict future areas of 
conflict is to use past behavior, either in terms of actual inci-
dents or as a collection of incidents (i.e. hotspots) as indicators 
of future behavior.  Hotspot mapping is the use of cartographic 
techniques to create and visualize cluster density or the inten-
sity of events over a geographic area.  As better data and more 
advanced mapping techniques become available, opportunities 
emerge to move beyond historically based hotspot and density 
mapping to a near real-time evidence-based, predictive risk as-
sessment strategy.   
Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM) is an approach to spatial risk as-
sessment that utilizes geographic information systems and re-
mote sensing to visualize, measure, and analyze geospatial data. 
RTM is a combination of separate map layers that once overlaid 
together highlight the presence, absence, or intensity of numer-
ous factors geospatially on a terrain map.    A concise RTM is 
designed to be predictive and, as such, can illuminate which of 
Syria’s WMD sites are at the greatest risk of compromise.  This 
RTM examines (1) the disposition of the Syrian regime, FSA 
and Jihadist armed forces, (2) the locations that experienced 
the greatest level of conflict, and (3) identifies Syria’s WMD 
sites.  As expected, it found that most of the armed clashes have 
taken place inside villages and cities along the country’s main 
north-south highway.
The strategic position of Homs at the intersection of Syria’s main 
east-west and primary north-south highways has exposed it to 
the greatest level of conflict in Syria. The RTM highlighted the 
city of Homs as the greatest concern based on its strategic loca-
tion and high frequency of combat operations, as well as other 
at risk WMD locations.  We then overlaid the identified op-
position units who were in close proximity and determined to 
have the highest potential of supporting US policy objectives. 
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
This research project clearly demonstrates the usefulness of 
leveraging open source social media information (YouTube, 
Twitter, Facebook) and advanced analytical methodologies like 
social network analysis to increase our understanding of dark 
networks like the Syrian opposition.  The insights provided by 
social media exploitation, social network analysis, and the geo-
spatial risk terrain model received high marks from both mili-
tary planners and leaders exposed to the project.  Intelligence 
professionals marveled at how quickly three researchers could 
illuminate and map elements of 
the Syrian political and armed 
opposition with open source 
information.  One officer famil-
iar with the project said “this 
would have taken an entire 
intelligence section numerous 
months to develop the ana-
lytical products and potentially 
years for the intelligence community to develop the sources 
and contacts with access to this type of information.”
Of course open source social media information and advanced 
analytical methodologies are not a panacea.  Some wonder if 
we can really trust or verify the veracity of information posted 
using social media sources. Researchers involved in this study 
shared this same skepticism but were surprised at the overall 
accuracy of posted information.  Much of the information, 
such as pictures, videos, and tweets, were geo-tagged and could 
be quickly verified geospatially.  Researchers found one website 
that was crowd sourcing pictures of Syrian military installa-
tions and uploading the information into a visual map display. 
Leveraging this type of geo-tagged information can greatly 
expand our knowledge into denied areas where human intel-
ligence sources are lacking.    Additionally, some information 
can actually be self-correcting, in that the wisdom of the crowd 
can squash false statements.  That being said, information 
gleaned from open-source should still be verified and cross-
checked with other information sources. 
Additionally, leveraging advanced analytical methodologies 
like social network analysis will require the development of 
highly skilled analysts with the proper education and train-
ing.  Defining network boundaries and capturing complete re-
lational data on networks is difficult work.  Analysts must be 
capable of developing detailed ontologies and codebooks that 
standardize data collection and entry into analytical packages. 
Keeping social network analysis information current is also a 
challenge as resistance networks are constantly in flux as they 
recruit new members and suffer losses. However, in doing so 
analysts have the opportunity to glean insights on how the 
network is changing over time.  Additional challenges include 
access to open-source information as many military networks 
restrict access to social media sites and most of the analytical 
software packages used in this study are currently not approved 
to be loaded on military networks. 
 continued from page 3
“ We use Facebook to schedule the protests, 
Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell 
the world.” 
- ANONYMOUS CAIRO ACTIVIST 
CONCLUSION
Major General (MG) Michael T. Flynn recently noted that af-
ter ten years of continuous U.S. combat operations -- America’s 
“intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer funda-
mental questions about the environment in which we [DoD] 
operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.” 
Both MG Flynn and General Stanley McChrystal emphasized 
the need for US intelligence collection efforts to continuously 
evolve as the asymmetrical conflicts in the future “will be won 
by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy.” 
This is particularly true for developing UW intervention 
strategies that rely on deep socio-cultural understanding and 
seek to illuminate resistance elements that are often operating 
in denied areas.  This essay demonstrates that by combining 
open source social media information and advanced analytical 
methodologies such as social network analysis and geospatial 
risk terrain modeling, researchers can provide insights and an-
alytical products that can inform the crafting of UW interven-
tion strategies.  As we saw in this paper, researchers were able 
to leverage social media exploitation of open-source content 
(YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) and SNA to first examine the 
Syrian political and armed opposition network’s topography 
which included the identification of central actors and actors 
with brokerage potential based on their structural position 
within the social network as well as cohesive subgroups within 
the network.  These techniques enhance our understanding 
of complex networks and move well beyond traditional link 
analysis.   Next, through social media exploitation they iden-
tify key FSA entities/individuals who appear “cooperative” and 
potentially could be leveraged in support US policy objectives. 
Finally, through Risk Terrain Modeling they mapped Syrian 
WMD sites and determined which sites were at greatest risk of 
compromise and which opposition units were in proximity to 
potentially assist given a change in the US posture towards the 
Assad Regime.  It is this type analysis that informs the devel-
opment of UW intervention strategies designed to provide US 
policy makers options to leverage indigenous resistance poten-
tial when appropriate.
In closing, given the unprecedented amounts of raw informa-
tion today’s analyst must ingest, MG Flynn highlighted four 
critical elements: “analysts must absorb information with the 
thoroughness of historians, organize it with the skill of librar-
ians, and disseminate it with the zeal of a journalist…. [an ana-
lyst] must embrace open-source, population-centric informa-
tion [social media] as the lifeblood of their analytical work.” 
While each conflict is unique, one thing is clear, social media 
will continue to be leveraged to effect political change.  With 
this in mind, future UW campaign planners will need to em-
brace open source social media information and the advanced 




DA Outstanding Theses Recipients using SNA
In December, MAJ Richard Teta and MAJ Jason Brown, two 
Defense Analysis (DA) graduates were awarded for outstand-
ing theses. 
MAJ Teta’s thesis, titled “Getting Ugly: Exploring Network De-
velopment in ‘The Ugly American’” illuminates and elucidates 
the unique characteristics of network design approaches that 
appear in the book. This study also seeks to re-emphasize the 
important and often overlooked principles of effective host na-
tion interaction presented in “The Ugly American” that have 
been recognized and discussed by generations of Foreign Ser-
vice officers, military advisors, and civilian volunteers. 
MAJ Teta leveraged SNA theory, one of the CORE Lab staple 
methodologies to reveal how techniques designed for network 
analysis and dark network interdiction can also help reveal dis-
tinct characteristics of successful approaches to host nation in-
teraction and indigenous network development. 
MAJ Brown’s thesis, titled “Improving Nonlethal Targeting: A 
Social Network Analysis Method for Military Planners”, ex-
plores how a deception plan against a terrorist network can be 
informed and prepared using social network analysis methods. 
Selecting targets that fragment the network becomes the object of 
the deception, whereas the actual targets of deception are individ-
uals who are connected to these fragmentation nodes. A simula-
tion of how information diffuses through the network helps iden-
tify how rapidly and how far a misinformation message might 
spread. Social network analysis also shows where intelligence 
collection might be incorporated to provide feedback about the 
success of message dissemination and the deception effort.
Figure 1: Sociogram of political and military opposition 
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The Internationalization of the 
FARC: Brokers, Key Players and 
Emergent Leaders
By Dr. Sean Everton, COL Greg Wilson, RA Dan Cunningham,  
MAJ Doug Zimmerman and COL Carlos Padilla (COLAR)
The FARC is an insurgent group based in 
Colombia that is believed to be the old-
est and, at its height, the largest guerrilla 
movement in the world. It was officially 
founded in 1964 in order to protect rural 
peasants against the harsh policies of large 
landowners and provide them education 
in exchange for food and supplies. Over 
time, however, it has become increasing 
intertwined with narco-trafficking activi-
ties while transforming itself into a more 
internationally networked organization 
that displays little or no concern for the 
peasants it once protected. Its continual 
violation of human rights has led left-
leaning intellectuals and the international 
community to turn against the movement. 
At the same time the Colombian govern-
ment has become more adept at counter-
ing the FARC’s activities, which has made 
it a difficult environment for the FARC to 
function, forcing it to increasingly operate 
across sovereign national borders. 
The transformation of the FARC from a 
local insurgency into a more internation-
ally networked organization is the sub-
ject of this recent paper produced by the 
CORE Lab. Using the tools of social net-
work analysis (SNA), and drawing from 
a unique data set including information 
extracted from official documentation of 
the Colombian Government, it uncovers 
key leaders who are actively engaged in 
this transformation, many of whom have 
already established themselves outside of 
Colombia. Specifically, the authors utilize 
several social network analysis metrics 
in order to identify important brokers, 
key players, and emergent leaders within 
the FARC’s leadership network. The bro-
kerage potential and key player metrics 
identify potentially important leaders and 
those who may control the flow of infor-
mation and resources within the network, 
while the emergent leader metrics seek 
to uncover those actors who may not be 
currently in positions of leadership but 
whose current position increases the like-
lihood that in the future they will. The au-
thors then rank actors by the proportion 
in which they rank in the top-fifteen for 
each metric.
Consequently, the analysis uncovers a 
series of individuals who appear to be 
significant players within the FARC lead-
ership network. Interestingly, of the top-
ten, only two are listed as known leaders 
of the FARC by Wikipedia (2011). This 
finding highlights one of SNA’s strengths: 
namely, its ability to not only identify 
known leaders within an organization, 
but to identify actors, in this case key 
front and bloc leaders, who either are or 
are at least in the position to exert influ-
ence on a group’s operations. In other 
words, SNA has identified several FARC 
members who appear to be flying below 
the conventional wisdom radar, but are 
most likely playing (or will play) key roles 
in the FARC. What is striking is that only 
one of these leaders currently lives in 
Colombia fulltime. The rest live outside 
of Colombia’s borders in some capacity: 
two bounce between Colombia and Ven-
ezuela, one between Venezuela and Cuba, 
another between Colombia and Brazil, 
and three live in Venezuela. The impor-
tant players identified in the analysis 
also have known connections in several 
other countries, including Canada, Ec-
uador, Peru, Argentina, Paraguay, Cuba, 
Mexico, Bolivia, and Costa Rica, to name 
a few. The authors are clear, however, that 
they do not suggest this is an entirely new 
phenomenon or that the FARC is aban-
doning Colombia as its prime area of op-
erations, but that attempts to disrupt the 
FARC in the future will need to take the 
FARC’s international character (and key 
players) into account. 
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The graph for the tweets is created every time a query is requested 
from Twitter and can be automatically updated as quickly as 8 
seconds after the initial message is tweeted. The nodes them-
selves are selectable and will augment the original search query 
to include this hashtag, username, or keyword. This is a measure 
to help limit the amount of noise in a given graph. A clustering 
algorithm is applied to the network and groupings are assigned 
and represented by color assignment. Based on log-based degree 
centrality, the size of the node reflects the number of connection 
each username or hashtag accompanies. Considering Twitter is 
a directed network, edges reflect the direction of the message. 
These directed networks highlight both the groupings and cen-
trality, with a bias towards increased inner-cluster strength versus 
out of cluster nodes. The importance of these saliency changes is 
to highlight nodes of interest or key players, which is important 
in dark networks.
We appended a Google Map that shows geotagged tweets with 
the tweets themselves. This allows the user the ability to view 
the tweet and from where it originated. We created a text GUI 
that displays the tweets along with the URLs, hashtags, and us-
ers. The URLs are selectable and will show the website in a new 
window. This will allows the user to see if a news article, You-
Tube video, blog, social networking post, etc. is causing an in-
creased number of tweets. 
Visualization in Long Term
We provide a mechanism to group various datasets together for 
a single visualization. This can then be outputted as a .gexf, .net, 
or .dl network type.  
We also developed our own means of visualizing entire proj-
ects called TweetViewer. This web application is to be used with 
DTNA and will display the completed network. TweetViewer for 
DTNA promotes the temporal data associated with the network 
by providing a timeline to allow a user the ability to specify at 
which point in time they are interested in viewing the network or 
the network’s evolution over time. As DTNA’s network visualiza-
tion, edges reflect the direction of the message. Additionally, we 
differentiated the nodes that originated from the tweet by aug-
menting and animating the nodes’ borders as time progresses. 
Lastly, users can search based on the tweet to showcase nodes that 
include certain text. 
Current Usage and Initial Findings
This project was only recently developed, but has already been 
employed by 45 users from a variety of military groups or orga-
nizations, ranging from civilian use to higher ranking officers. 
This usage has accounted for more than 250 queries and has 
pulled roughly 100,000 tweets as of publication. The majority 
of the tweets have centered on search areas (geographically) in 
Syria and the Philippines. Only 18% of the tweets pulled from 
these areas are geotagged. The most common search term is 
the hashtag “#FSA” for Free Syrian Army. There were roughly 
10,000 URLs from the 100,000 tweets, which suggest a high in-
fluence on external websites driving the tweets. 
Future Development
There are three avenues of research that we are currently interest-
ed in pursuing: 1) visualizing sentiment in Twitter posts, 2) de-
termining the value of networks created using either username 
-> username, username -> hashtag, or hashtag -> hashtag con-
nections, and 3) visualizing temporal data using more specific 
temporal dependent cluster algorithms and network centrality.
CORE Leadership and Faculty Spotlight 
Dr. Sean Everton is an Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Defense Analysis and Co-Director of the CORE Lab at NPS. He 
currently specializes in the use of social network analysis to track 
and disrupt dark networks and teaches two courses within the 
CORE track. Before coming to NPS in 2007, he was an adjunct 
professor at both Santa Clara University and Stanford Univer-
sity — the latter, where he earned his MA and Ph.D. in Sociology. 
In November, Dr. Everton published “Disrupting Dark Net-
works: Structural Analysis in Social Sciences” published by 
Cambridge Press. The book is the first of its kind in that it 
exposes readers to both the theoretical and the practical ap-
plication of social network analysis within the context of dark 
networks (i.e. illegal and covert). Readers are introduced to 
a range of theories regarding dark 
networks along with exposure to 
network visualizations approaches, 
the four “metric families” (topog-
raphy, cohesive subgroups, central-
ity and brokerage), positions, roles 
and block-modeling, and more 
advanced topics such as dynamic 
network analysis and statistical ap-
proaches to network analysis. Dr. 
Everton simultaneously introduces 
readers to three prominent social 
network analysis software packages, 
namely UCINET, Pajek, and ORA. 
 continued from page 1
Dr. Sean Everton 
Assistant Professor 
and CORE Lab  Co-Director
CORE Welcomes LTC Max Moore and LTC Glenn Johnson 
as the Lab’s First Deputy Directors
LTC Max Moore is serving as a 
CORE Lab Deputy Director and is 
working on the lab’s structured col-
lection tool suite.  He is a career Ar-
mor offi  cer who has served as a Di-
visional Cavalry Troop Commander 
in Korea, Brigade and Battalion S3 
in 4-25 IN(ABN) in Alaska and Iraq, 
and as a JCS Afghan Hand.  LTC 
Moore came to the CORE Lab from 
El Paso where he commanded 4-17 
IN BN (Stryker).  LTC Moore has a BS in Biology from State 
University of New York at New Paltz, an MS from the School of 
Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and a MS from the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Operations Research Department. LTC 
Moore speaks fl uent Spanish, passable English, and Dari.
LTC Johnson is serving as a CORE 
Lab Deputy Director and Uncon-
ventional Warfare Fusion Cell Pro-
gram Manger.  LTC Johnson is a ca-
reer Special Forces offi  cer who has 
served as an SFODA Commander 
in 5th Special Forces Group (Air-
borne) and multiple company com-
mands in 3rd Special Forces Group 
(Airborne).  Following 3rd Group, 
LTC Johnson was the Professor of 
Military Science at Northern Arizona University.  LTC Johnson 
came to the CORE Lab from Afghanistan where he commanded 
a Security Forces Assistance Team.  LTC Johnson has a BS from 
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Hamburg, Germany                   
& Xi’an, China
CORE Lab Provides Analytical Training to the   
State Department - Mapping the Syrian Opposition
Th e CORE Lab is providing advanced network analysis training and fi eld data collection 
tools with the Lighthouse Project to Department of State’s Confl ict Stabilization Offi  ce 
(CSO) Team. Th e CORE Lab team (including a student from the Defense Analysis de-
partment) provided an orientation of Visual Analytics, Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
and Lighthouse fi eld-data collection technology to improve CSO’s situational aware-
ness of Syrian key leaders and and visualizations of Syrian opposition networks. Th e 
sociogram to the right illustrates Syrian opposition members and related organizations 
using SNA network visualizations. Department of State’s CSO Syria team has sent fi eld 
operatives and analysts to the CORE Lab in Monterey in March to receive social net-
work analysis training.  Th e CORE Lab also provide on-scene training and education 
in Turkey on several analytical capabilities and fi eld-data collection methods that could 
support their mission in providing non-lethal support to non-violent Syrian opposition 
members. Th is eff ort provides CSO a new capability to collect and visualize data in the fi eld as well as Palantir stand-alone com-
puters to aid CSO in transmitting data from its location in Turkey back to its headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Th is partnership 
continues to expand and the hope is to have State Department offi  cers attend the Defense Analysis program in the future.
